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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN MARK HANSEN,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Lower Court Civil No. 920902292

-vs-

Case No. 92 0474

TONY DONNELLY,

Priority Classification 14b

Defendant/Appellant.
APPEAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter

"defendant" or "Donnelly")

submits the following as his brief of appellant herein:

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to review the
is

vested

in

the

Utah

final order

Supreme

Court

and judgment herein

pursuant

to Utah Code

Annotated, Section 2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The matter below is an action
resulted

in

action

for

defendant for violation of

a

for injunctive

finding

of

relief, which

contempt

that restraining

against

order.

the

The orders

appealed from are the order finding the defendant in contempt for
violation of the

injunction,

the

order

denying

the defendant

relief from

that finding

of contempt,

and the judgment entered

against the defendant for attorney's fees pursuant to the finding
of contempt.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following are the issues presented on appeal:
a.

Did the trial court err in making its judgment that the

defendant was in contempt of a prior order of the court?
b.

Did

defendant's

the

trial

motion

to

court
be

err

relieved

in

refusing

from

the

to

order

grant

holding

defendant in contempt?
c.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

awarding

plaintiff

attorney's fees in this action?
d.

Was

the

"Temporary

court below so vague in its

Restraining

Order" issued by the

requirement that

the defendant "act

reasonably" that defendant was incapable of knowing what duty the
court expected of him or of conforming his conduct to

this prior

order of the court?
e.
vague

as

If the
to

be

prior injunction
unenforceable,

of the trial court was not so
did

the

defendant's

conduct

actually violate the order?
f.

Did

defendant

have

proper

hearing?

2

notice

of

the

contempt

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

78,

Chapter

determinative of the outcome in this appeal.

32, may

be

Also, the following

case law is determinative or may be determinative in this action:
Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Labrum, 762 P.2d

1070

(Utah 1988); and Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 544 (Utah 1981).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

standard

of

review

presented on appeal is
issue

presented

is

in

this

a reversal
one

of

appeal as to all issues

of error

law.

standard, since the

Utah Farm Production Credit

Association v. Labrumr supra.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the final judgment and
the Third

Judicial District

Court in

and for Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel,
presiding, which

found defendant

violating an injunction, and

order entered in

District Court Judge

to be in contempt of court for

then denied

his motion

for relief

from that finding of contempt.
The

trial

court

entered

a

minute

entry

decision dated

September 8, 1992.

Pursuant to that minute entry, the court made

findings

and

of

fact

conclusions

of

law and an order in re:

contempt and restraining order, all entered on or about September
11,

1992.

The

defendant

subsequently moved the court for an
3

order

relieving him from the order of

September 11, 1992. The

trial court denied defendant's motion for relief from judgment on
September

25, 1992. Finally,

defendant

for

plaintiff's

a

money

court

judgment

against

the

costs and attorney's fees was

entered on October 6, 1992.
The defendant moved the trial court, pursuant to
of the

Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure, to

Rule 60(b)

relieve him from the

effects of the order in re: contempt and restraining order, which
motion was subsequently denied.

This motion has no effect on the

pendency of this appeal, and is

in

There

is

no

motion

pending

fact

pursuant

part

of

this appeal.

to Rule 50(a) or 50(b),

52(b), 54(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT QF Tflff FACTS
Plaintiff is the former
Donnelly,

f.k.a. Michael

husband
Hanson.

of

a

Defendant

married to Michael Donnelly, and has been her
times relevant

to this

appeal.

woman,

one Michael

Donnelly is now

husband during all

Plaintiff and Michael Donnelly

have a child, Trevor, with whom plaintiff is entitled to exercise
visitation.

The child resides with his mother and Donnelly.

The plaintiff

filed this action below seeking a restraining

order against the defendant.
signed

by

the

trial

court

defendant on the same day.
before the

court on

A

temporary restraining

order was

on April 23, 1992, and served upon
That

restraining

order

was heard

May 1, 1992. As a result of that temporary
4

restraining
"Temporary

order

and

Restraining

hearing,
Order"

another
(which

injunction) was entered on June 5, 1992.

order

also

entitled

is, in fact, a permanent
This second "Temporary

hereafter referred to as the "June 5th Order."
The June

5th Order restrained and enjoined the defendant as

follows:
1.

Defendant is enjoined and restrained
a. from in any manner interfering
his right [sic] to visit the minor
child, Trevor, or to communicate
with the minor child's mother to
arrange visitation; and
b.
from in any manner arguing,
[sic] harassing, or confronting the
Plaintiff
with
the
use
of
insulting, derogatory or abusive
language when the Plaintiff picks
up and returns his minor child for
the
purpose
of
exercising
Plaintiff's right of visitation or
at any other time; and
c.
from in any manner making
demeaning
remarks
about
the
Plaintiff in the presence of the
minor child or others.
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to act
reasonably in the presence of each other. (R.O.A.
42, 43.) (emphasis added)

On June 5th, 1992, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order
in re: contempt and notice, together with a supporting affidavit.
The

affidavit

was

defendant was in
alleged in

dated

contempt

this affidavit

May
of

26, 1992.
court.

It alleged that the

Specifically, plaintiff

that on Memorial Day, May 25th, 1992,
5

". .

. the

Defendant attempted

opening the

to intimidate

the plaintiff by

front door of defendant's home and stepping onto the

front porch and positioning himself physically near the Plaintiff
indicating his

intention to

take the

child from the Plaintiff,

and when the Defendant left the premises where the child resides,
the Defendant
again in

followed the Plaintiff toward the Plaintiff's car,

a threatening

allegations came

manner."

on for

a trial

(R.O.A. 40)
on June

The plaintiff's

29, 1992.

The court

heard the testimony of the plaintiff, Donnelly, Michael Donnelly,
and

others, and

subsequently

entered the orders which are the

subject of this appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court

erred

in

entering

its

orders

herein as

follows:
1.

The trial court erred in finding the defendant to be in

contempt of court based on the testimony at
29, 1992.

Specifically,

the trial

held June

the trial court erred in the following

particulars:
a.

Some of the conduct for which

in contempt

allegedly occurred

the defendant

on May 25, 1992. The order

of the court which the defendant was found
was not

was found

to have violated

entered until June 5, 1992, over ten days after the

defendant's
occurred.

contemptuous

conduct

is

alleged

to

have

Defendant cannot be found in contempt, under the
6

facts and

circumstances of

oral ruling in open
entered after

this case, on the

court made

he committed

May 1,

basis of an

1992, and

an order

the acts for which he was found

in contempt; and
b.

The trial court's ruling from the bench on May 1, 1992,

which

was

embodied

in

the

June

5th

Order, contains a

requirement that the defendant "act reasonably."
provision of

the June 5th Order, for violation of which the

defendant was found in contempt.
its language

that it

know his duty

under

actions to

It is this

is not
the

This order is so

vague in

possible for the defendant to

court

order

the order, because it

or

to

conform his

is impossible for him to

know exactly what behavior is prohibited.
c.

Defendant was not given adequate notice

of what issues

would be tried to the court on June 29, 1992.
2.

The

relieve the

trial

court

defendant

from

abused
the

its discretion in failing to

order

finding

him

to

be in

contempt, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 1, above.
3.

The trial

court erred in ordering the defendant to pay

plaintiff attorney's fees in the sum
for contempt,

for reason

that no

first instance.

7

of $1,000.00

contempt had

as a sanction

occurred in the

ARGUMENT: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
DEFENDANT TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
It is the law in the state of Utah that a person may be held
in contempt

of court for a violation of a court's order if three

conditions are satisfied.
known

of

the

duty

First

imposed

of

all,

Finally, the

party must

have wilfully

comply

the

order.

court

party

by the court's order.

party must have had the ability to comply

with

the

with the

must have
Second, the

court order.

and knowingly refused to

Utah

Farm

Production Credit

Association v. Labrum, supra.

A.
THERE WAS NO ORDER IN PLACE FROM WHICH CONTEMPT
COULD BE FOUND AT THE TIME DEFENDANT IS ALLEGED TO HAVE
COMMITTED HIS ACTS OF CONTEMPT.

As noted

above, this

was commenced by

the

entire proceeding between the parties

filing

of

a

complaint

and

a temporary

restraining order signed April 23, 1992.
As a matter of law, that temporary restraining order expired
by its own terms within ten days of the date of the
May

3,

1992.

itself,

The

indicates

automatically.

that

The order

expire by

it's [sic]

time,

is

it

language

extended

against whom the

Order

of

the

the first restraining order,
restraining

states as follows:

terms within
for
is

a

like

directed
8

order, or on

10 days

order

expires

"This Order shall

unless, during said

period or unless the party
consents

that

it

may be

extended for a longer period."
This original
1, 1992.

(R.O.A. 17)

temporary restraining

order was heard on May

The trial court made an oral ruling.

This ruling was

not embodied in an order of the court, however, until plaintiff's
counsel prepared an order and submitted

it to

the court.

This

order was ultimately signed on June 5, 1992.
In the

interim, during

the Memorial Day weekend, 1992, the

defendant allegedly committed
plaintiff was

picking up

certain

acts

at

his

his child for visitation.

home while
It is these

actions allegedly committed during the Memorial Day weekend which
gave rise to the motion for contempt in this case.
There

was

no

court

order

in effect on May 25, 1992, for

violation of which the defendant could be found in contempt. The
prior

restraining

order, by

its

own terms, had expired. The

subsequent ordered was not entered until 11 days
The defendant

cannot be

after May 25th.

found in contempt of an order which did

not exist.

B.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HEARING EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S
CONDUCT,
OTHER
THAN THAT WHICH WAS
IDENTIFIED IN THE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND AFFIDAVIT.

The plaintiff, in his motion for finding of contempt and his
supporting

affidavit,

defendant was
contempt

of

alleged
court.

identified
to

have

one particular day upon which
committed

Specifically,
9

actions constituting

plaintiff alleged that the

defendant

was

in

contempt

for

his

conduct

on May 25, 1992.

(R.O.A. 39, 40, 41)
However, during the trial of this action, the
permitted

to

testify

several other dates.
trial

court

used

regarding

(Tr. 6-29-92,

evidence
defendant

paragraphs

13

and

of

which

p.13-16.)

occurred

on

Ultimately, the

of the defendant's conduct on these

other dates to find
12

incidents

plaintiff was

in

the

contempt.
court's

Specifically, in

findings

of

fact and

conclusions of law entered on September 11, 1992, the court makes
reference to
21, 1992.

the defendant's

conduct on June 20, 1992, and June

(R.O.A. 90)

Defendant went to trial in this matter believing that he had
to defend

himself only

against charges

for conduct on May 25, 1992.
court regarding
well.

However,

incidents on

that he was in contempt
evidence came

June 20th

before the

and June 21st, 1992, as

Defendant was ultimately held in contempt

for his conduct

on all three of these dates.
The failure
for contempt
21st, violated

to give defendant notice that he would be tried

for actions

on June

20th and June

the defendant's right to due process.

given notice of the
opportunity to

which occurred

contempt

defend against

charges

against

those charges.

him

He was not
and

a fair

For this reason,

the court's contempt findings are contrary to law.
Further, defendant was never served personally with a notice
of

trial

about

contempt.

He

was
10

served via counsel, only,

(R.O.A.

36#38).

There

is

no

indication

defendant was ever served the supporting

in

the

file that

affidavit, even through

counsel.

C.
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CAPABLE OF KNOWING WHAT THE
COURT ORDER WAS OR OF CONFORMING HIS CONDUCT TO THE
TERMS OF THE ORDER.

As noted

above, two of the three requirements for a court's

finding of contempt are a finding that the defendant knew
duty imposed

by the court's order, and had the ability to comply

with the order. Given the
defendant

of the

has

been

language of

found

in

the order

contempt, neither

for which the
of these two

requirements is satisfied.
The defendant was found in contempt of the
he "act reasonably."

requirement that

He has not been found in contempt of any of

the more specific requirements set forth in the June 5th Order.
The June 5th Order
interfering

with

specifically

plaintiff's

restrained

rights

of

defendant from

visitation

or

from

communicating with the minor child's mother regarding visitation.
It

also

restrained

defendant

confronting the plaintiff with
or abusive

language when

from

arguing with, harassing or

the use

of insulting, derogatory

the plaintiff picks up and returns the

child for purposes of visitation.

The June

the

demeaning

defendant

from

making

any

5th Order restrained
remarks

about

the

plaintiff in the presence of the minor child or others. Finally,
11

it ordered defendant to "act reasonably."
The

findings

of

support of the trial
finding that

fact

entered

court's contempt

September 11, 1992, in

order do

not contain any

the defendant had violated any of the more specific

requirements of the June 5th Order.
finding that

on

(R.O.A. 43)

The court does

not make any

the defendant stopped the plaintiff from exercising

visitation or communicating with his child's mother, and there is
no finding

that the defendant used any language to argue with or

demean or intimidate the plaintiff, as proscribed by the June 5th
Order.
Instead, the

findings of

fact which putatively support the

contempt order are to the effect that the
eighteen inches

to two feet of the plaintiff while the child was

exchanged for visitation, walked
plaintiff off

defendant stood within

behind plaintiff

defendant's property,

and made

to escort the

a hand gesture to

the plaintiff which only the plaintiff and defendant could see.
These findings do not
violation
Order.

of

the

more

support

a

specific

finding

requirements

of

contempt for

of the June 5th

The only possible basis left for the court's order is the

catch-all language that defendant was to "act reasonably."
The

requirement

that

a

party

"act reasonably" is such a

vague and non-specific requirement that it did not
on notice
not

put

of what
on

specific conduct was expected of him.

notice

requirements of

put defendant

of

how

the court.

to

conform

his

conduct

He was
to

the

To "act reasonably" is such a broad
12

concept that the definition of this phrase will vary from citizen
to citizen.
The order from which the finding of contempt flows is simply
too non-specific for the defendant either to understand what duty
the court has imposed upon him or how he can

conform his conduct

to

cannot

the

order

of

the

court.

Defendant

be found in

contempt, as a matter of law.

D.
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
COURT TO MAKE A FINDING OF CONTEMPT.

The trial

Therefore, the

convincing
elements

contempt

contempt

trial

evidence, that

of

THE TRIAL

court had a duty to find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that defendant was in
supra.

FOR

had

convincing evidence of each

of

court.

Salzettir

court had to find, by clear and

each

and

been

satisfied.

of the

every

one

of

the three

Absent clear and

three elements

of contempt,

the lower court cannot be sustained on appeal.
Upon

review, this

court

underlying order was lawful.

must first determine whether the
This

is

the

challenge

defendant to the order in the previous point of argument.
court should determine that the underlying order is
this court

must still

determine whether

violating the order constituted contempt
Production Credit

Association v.

If the

lawful, then

defendant's conduct in
of

court.

Labrum. supra.

13

made by

Utah Farm

Defendant has

the

burden

of

demonstrating

in

light most favorable to the trial
at trial

this appeal that, viewed in a
court's finding,

the evidence

was insufficient to support the trial court's findings.

Labrum, supra.
adequate to

In

the

support the

instant

case, the

trial court

evidence

was not

findings. Most certainly,

the evidence at the June 29th trial was

inadequate to

support a

finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant was
in contempt.
A review of the
allegation
plaintiff

that
simply

Plaintiff viewed

plaintiff's

defendant
did

not

testimony

in

was

in

contempt

like

to

be

support
shows

around

of his

that

the

the defendant.

all defendant's conduct from a perspective that

it was demeaning of or threatening

to plaintiff.

However, when

the plaintiff's testimony about the defendant's conduct is viewed
from an objective perspective, it is
conduct

did

not

constitute

clear that

contempt.

clear and convincing evidence that his
Plaintiff admitted
viewed

all

the

at the

defendant's

Certainly, there is not

conduct was contemptuous.

outset of

conduct

the defendant's

his testimony that he

during

the

incidents in

question from

a perspective and expectation that defendant would

behave badly.

Plaintiff

testified about

defendant reaching out

to take the child at the conclusion of visitation as follows:
Q.
How is it intimidating for him to reach
his hand out to take the child?
A.
Based on the previous experience that I
had had with him, the hostility that he had
14

demonstrated earlier; he came at me out of
the door with the same expression on his
face.
The
same intimidating, hostile
presence and demeanor, extended his arms. . .
(Tr., 6-29-92, p.26 11. 19-25.)
It is

clear from

this testimony that the plaintiff expects

the worst of all defendant's conduct,

even when

that conduct is

as innocent as reaching out to pick up a child.
Plaintiff was

intimidated and

upset by defendant's conduct

of answering the doorbell at defendant's
on his

own front

porch, and

own residence, stepping

watching the plaintiff drive away.

The plaintiff testified as follows:
. . . I got in my car, and he stood at the
end of his porch with his arms folded, as I
backed out the driveway and left.
Q.
. . . As you exited the residence and he
followed you; what was the proximity between
the two of you?
A.
At the door, he was probably eighteen
inches or two feet, and as I left the porch,
he was probably, I would guess, maybe eight
feet - - eight to ten feet behind me.
Q.

But he followed you out to your car?

A.
Well, he followed me to my car. He
followed me out, then he stopped at the end
of his porch and stood with his arms folded
as I drove off the driveway.
(Tr. 6-29-92,
p.11 11.1-13.)
Again,

the

plaintiff's

paranoia that
the door,
home

with

perspective

he describes

is

being afraid

so

colored by his own

of defendant answering

and defendant watching him drive away from defendant's
his

arms

folded.

Absolutely
15

nothing

about

the

defendant's

objective

behavior,

constitutes contempt of court.
intimidation

is

subjective.

described

by

the

plaintiff,

All of the plaintiff's feeling of
He

describes

this sensation as

follows:
A.
I think as a gesture, I think as he
stood at the door and he stepped out the
door, the look on
his
face
was very
threatening, very intimidating, very hostile.
As I stepped off the porch, he walked behind
me.
I turned around and looked at him. He
stood at the porch with his arms folded.
He
still had the same threatening demeanor about
him. (Tr. 6-29-92, p.11 11.19-25.)
Plaintiff also testified about
Saturday,

June

20,

1992

and

incidents which

Sunday,

June

occurred on

21, 1992.

plaintiff describes objectively acceptable behavior from
subjective and

paranoid state

defendant was in

contempt

of

Again,
his own

of mind,

to attempt to prove the

court.

Plaintiff

testified as

follows:
. . . I got - - I parked on the driveway, got
Trevor, and took him to the door. I rang the
doorbell.
The door opened and both Tony and
Michael came out of the house and stood at
the doorstep.
And I, again, took a step
back. I gave Trevor to his mother.
And again, Mr. Donnelly's presence was that
same glare, that same intimidating demeanor.
And uh - - I gave Trevor to his mother,
turned around and walked back to my car. . .
Q.
How close
to you did Mr.
position himself on this occasion?

Donnelly

A.
Well, again, it was eighteen inches to
two feet.
(Tr. 6-29-92, p.15 1.13 - p.16
1.1.)
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The

only

conduct

which

defendant

potentially be interpreted as an act
by

the

plaintiff

as

occurring

describes

of aggression

on

June

which might
is described

20, 1992.

Plaintiff

testified as follows:
THE WITNESS:
He was standing inside his
garage, which, the garage door was open. And
there were two cars inside the garage. He
was standing inside the garage and didn't
appear to be doing anything but looking at me
as I approached the porch. And again, with
just kind of a glare.
I picked up Trevor, took him out to the
car, and put him inside the car. I looked
back at the garage, and Mr. Donnelly was
still standing inside the garage, glaring at
me, motionless.
I backed down the
driveway, turned
around and headed right straight away from
the driveway.
And when I looked in my
rearview mirror, I saw Mr. Donnelly emerge
from the garage. He stood at the opening of
the garage. He held his arms up, wrapped one
hand - Q.
. . . Would you state to the court to
the best of your memory, the motion?
A.
He went like this (indicating) at me, as
I was driving away.
And my impression was
that he was simulating holding a gun —
pointing a gun at me as I drove away.
And I
observed this in the rearview mirror. (Tr.
6-29-92, p.14 11.6-25.)
The best example the plaintiff
nature about

the defendant's

which the plaintiff assumes
observes in

his rearview

can

give

of

contemptuous conduct
represents holding

any objective
is a gesture

a gun,

which he

mirror pulling out of a driveway.

Court must consider this testimony, as
17

to its

The

believability and

the bias

of the witness. This is certainly not evidence of such

a clear and convincing nature as to sustain a contempt finding.
Even if defendant acted
the conduct

does not

in the June 5th

exactly as

described by plaintiff,

violate any specific restriction set forth

Order.

Defendant

was

never

restrained from

gesturing at plaintiff.
Defendant's

wife,

Michael

Donnelly,

rational explanation for defendant's
about these episodes.

gave

conduct,

in

a

her testimony

She testified as follows:

Q.
And isn't it a fair statement that on
that occasion Tony positioned himself close
to Steve as the child was returned? . . .
Answer yes or no.
A.
No. I'm not going to say that, because
our front porch is very small. There's not
much room for all four of us to be out there.

Q.
I understand.
Knowing that that porch
was small, do you know of any reason why Tony
would even be at the front door, knowing that
Steve was returning Trevor, on that day and
at that hour?
A.
Yes, because I do not feel comfortable
being alone at any time with Steve at all.
Q.

I see.

A.
I never have.
He has harassed me and
intimidated me for the last seven years, and
I don't feel comfortable with - - I feel more
comfortable with Tony present.
Nothing was
said, and Steve handed me the child and
turned around and walked away. And no words
were said between Tony and Steve.
The most
we say is hi and goodbye. That's about it.
(Tr. 6-29-92, p.62 11.1-25.)
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perfectly

The

plaintiff

himself

entry of the first temporary
threatening
plaintiff.

or

admitted

at

restraining

inappropriate

trial that, after the
order, there

statements

made

were no

by defendant to

Plaintiff testified as follows:

A.
Uh - - with the exception of, there were
no verbal remarks made on the 25th of May.
There were on the 18th of April. And other
then that, his demeanor was pretty much the
same. Threatening and intimidating. (Tr. 629-92, p.12 11,8-11.)
When all

of the

clear from the trial
paranoid about

evidence is marshalled and reviewed, it is
transcript

the

plaintiff

absence

absence, would
from

satisfy the plaintiff.

his own home was specifically not

required defendant of by the court's June 5th
also no

is simply

the defendant, and that no conduct on the part of

the defendant, save total
However, total

that

restriction in

the June

Order.

There was

5th Order, regarding how close

the defendant could come to the plaintiff's person.
There is no factual basis for finding that
contempt of

court.

defendant was in

Certainly, there is no basis to make such a

finding by clear and convincing evidence.

E.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.
Because there

was never any basis for a finding of contempt

against the defendant in the first
in failing

GRANT THE

place, the

trial court erred

to relieve the defendant from that judgment and order
19

of

contempt,

when

court's attention.

the

error

of

the

The

trial

court

court was called to the
should

have

granted the

defendant's motion for relief from the contempt order.

F.
THE TRIAL COURT
ATTORNEY'S FEES.

ERRED IN AWARDING THE PLAINTIFF

In the judgment entered on October 6, 1992,

the trial court

awarded the plaintiff a judgment against defendant for $1,000.00,
representing plaintiff's
attorney's fees
was in

attorney's

was awarded

contempt

of

fees.

This

judgment for

solely on

the basis that defendant

These

fees

court.

attorney's

were for

plaintiff's damages for defendant's contempt.
However,

because

the

finding

of

contempt must fail, the

award of attorney's fees predicated upon that contempt
fail.

The

defendant

should

be

must also

relieved of the judgment for

attorney's fees.

CONCLUSION
For

the

contempt should

foregoing

reasons,

be reversed,

the

judgment

fees should be vacated.

trial

court's

order of

and this matter should be remanded

for a finding that the defendant
Further,

the

was not

in contempt

of court.

entered against defendant for attorney's
Finally, this matter

should be remanded

for the trial court to make a determination regarding an award of
attorney's fees to defendant for this appeal.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^

day of December, 1992.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY/C-r CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
Corporon

HEREBY
&

CERTIFY

Williams,

that

I

am

attorneys

employed

for

the

in the offices of
defendant/appellant

herein, and that I caused the foregoing APPEAL BRIEF to be served
upon plaintiff/respondent by placing <fuJti true and correct copies
of the same in an envelope addressed to:
THOMAS BLONQUIST
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
and depositing

the same,

sealed, with

first-class postage pre-

paid thereon, in the United States mail at
on the _ ^ L r day of

/%Z£

esn

b&^

Salt Lake

City, Utah

, 1992.

MART C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER and
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
(dated April 23, 1992)

r> jr %% «_..
n

**-*-«^^v- J

N

i

;

Thomas R. Blonguist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525

?I*-T

^^;L^rr

<LZRX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN MARK HANSEN,
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
^

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. ^/SMfs?

TONY DONNELLY,

Judge:

C(/

fooZ^

Defendant.
Having read and considered the Verified Complaint on file
herein and Plaintiff's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and Order to Show Cause, without notice, and it appearing
that the reguirements of Rule 65A.(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures have been met in that over the past three years the
Plaintiff and his former wife have, without incident, arranged for
visitation by the Plaintiff with his son but that since March 28,
1992 the Defendant has

interfered

visitation by issuing a unilateral

with Plaintiff's rights of
schedule of visitation and

informing the Plaintiff that those are the only times that he will
be able to see his son, that the Defendant has used vulgar and vile
language

and

made

unprovoked

movements

which

appear

to

the

Plaintiff to be suggestive of Defendant's intention to physically
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strike the Plaintiff and that during all conversations between the
parties,

the

Defendant's

demeanor

is

belligerent,

hostile,

threatening and abusive to the Plaintiff.
And it further appearing to the Court that over the past three
years, the Plaintiff has visited his son one evening per week and
weekends and that this schedule has been unilaterally altered by
the Defendant.
Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the Defendant be and he is hereby enjoined and restrained
a.

from in any manner interfering with Plaintiff's right to

visit the minor child or communicate with the minor child's mother
to arrange visitation;
b.

from in any manner communicating with the Plaintiff or

being within 200 feet of the premises where the Plaintiff may
reside or be employed or being within 50 feet of the Plaintiff or
his property when he picks up and returns his minor child, Trevor,
for the purposes of exercising Plaintiff's rights of visitation or
at any other time; and,
c.

from

in

any

manner

making

demeaning

remarks

about

Plaintiff in the presence of the minor child or others.
This Order shall be issued by the Clerk of the above entitled
Court upon the giving of security by the Plaintiff in the sum of

2
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It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant be
and appear before the above entitled Court, 240 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, on the

\

day of May, 1992 at

M

o'clock

_4_.m. to show cause, if any he has, why the Order should not
continue during the pendencey of this action.
This Order shall expire by it's terms within 10 days unless,
during said time, it is extended for a like period or unless the
party against whom the Order is directed consents that it may be
extended for a longer period.
DATED this

>~ x dav of April, 1992

ISSUED THiq
AT
\VSM5,

</p DAY OF APRIL, 1992

CLERK OF COURT
f%
BY

^

<_
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TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
(dated June 5, 1992)

Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN MARK HANSEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

)

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

)

Civil No. 920902292CV

]i

TONY DONNELLY,

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on for hearing before the
above entitled Court on the 1st day of May, 1992 at 9:00

a.m.

Plaintiff was represented by his attorney of record, Thomas R.
Blonquist and the Defendant was represented
Esquire.

by H. Don Sharp,

The Court heard the arguments of counsel and having

reviewed the pleadings on file herein and otherwise being fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor,
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the Temporary Restraining
Order issued in the above entitled matter on April 23, 1992 shall
continue in full force and effect during the pendency of the above
entitled matter as follows:
1.

Defendant is hereby enjoined and restrained
a.

from in any manner interfering his right to visit
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the minor child, Trevor, or communicate with the minor child's
mother to arrange visitation; and,
b.

from in any manner arguing, harassing or confronting

the Plaintiff with the use of insulting, derogatory or abusive
language when the Plaintiff picks up and returns his minor child
for the purposes of exercising Plaintiff's right of visitation or
at any other time; and,
c.

from in any manner making demeaning remarks about

the Plaintiff in the presence of the minor child or others.
2.

The Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to act reasonably

in the presence of each other.
DATED this

^

day of ^fey7l992.
BY THE COURT

Frank G. Noel, Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to H. Don Sharp, Esq. 2447 Kiesel
Avenue, Ogden, UT

84401 this JJBLTday pf J*ay, 1992.
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FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(in support of September 11, 1992 order)

ii'fr«i / r ! c r District

SEP 1 1 1S92
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN MARK HANSEN,

;

Plaintiff,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

]|

Civil No. 920902292CV

TONY DONNELLY,

]i

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.

]

The above entitled matter came on for hearing before the
Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, on the 29th day of June, 1992
commencing at 9:40 a.m. pursuant to the Motion of Plaintiff for an
Order in re Contempt.

Plaintiff was present and represented by

Thomas R. Blonquist, his attorney of record, and the Defendant was
present with his attorney, H. Don Sharp. Witnesses were called and
testified

under

direct

and

cross

examination,

exhibits

were

received in evidence and the matter was argued and submitted to the
Court for decision.

The Court, having heard and considered the

evidence received and the statements and arguments of counsel and
otherwise being fully advised

in the premises and good cause

appearing therefor, now makes and enters it's
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant is married to Plaintiff's former wife.

2.

In the Decree of Divorce that dissolved the bonds of

matrimony between Plaintiff and his former wife, she was awarded
the care, custody and control of the parties7 minor child, Trevor,
and

Plaintiff

was awarded

reasonable

and

liberal rights of

visitation.
3.

On or about April 18, 1992 Defendant informed Plaintiff

that all future arrangements for visitation must be made through
him.
4.

The above entitled matter was instituted by the Plaintiff

seeking an Order enjoining the Defendant from in any manner
communicating with the Plaintiff or being within 200 feet of the
premises where the Plaintiff resides or is employed or being within
50 feet of the Plaintiff or his property when he picks up and
returns Trevor for the purpose of exercising Plaintiff's rights of
visitation.
5.

Plaintiff

is

also

seeking

an

Order

enjoining

the

Defendant from in any manner making demeaning remarks about the
Plaintiff in the presence of Trevor or others.
6.

On April 23, 1992, a Temporary Restraining Order and

Order to Show Cause were issued requiring the Defendant to appear
on the 1st day of May at 9:00 a.m. and show cause why the Temporary
2
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Restraining Order should not be made permanent during the pendency
of the action.
7.

On

said date and time, the

Defendant appeared

with

counsel and the parties presented their statements, arguments and
proffers to the Court.
8.

The primary concern expressed by the Defendant at the

hearing was that a requirement that he not be within 50 feet of the
Plaintiff or his property when Plaintiff picks up and returns
Trevor for purposes of exercising Plaintiff's right of visitation
would require the Defendant to leave his home.
9.

After considering the matter, the Court informed the

Defendant that if what was stated in the Plaintiff's Affidavit was
true, his conduct was improper, that while there should be a
sufficient distance between Plaintiff and Defendant to avoid future
problems, it was not the Court's desire to require the Defendant to
remove himself from his home when the Plaintiff picked up and
delivered Trevor for visitation, that the Court did not want there
to be any further problems between the parties and, believing that
the parties understood the Court's position in this matter, ordered
that the Plaintiff and the Defendant conduct themselves reasonably
in the presence of each other and entered such an Order on the 5th
day of June, 1992.
10.

On the 25th day of May, while the Plaintiff was returning
3
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Trevor after exercising visitation, the Defendant placed himself in
the doorway of the residence approximately 18 inches to 2 feet from
the Plaintiff

and when the Plaintiff

left the residence, the

Defendant followed him, in close proximity, to the edge of the
Defendant's porch.
11.

While on the porch standing near the Plaintiff, the

Defendant, through his gestures, was threatening, intimidating and
hostile toward the Plaintiff.
12.

On June 20, 199 2 the Plaintiff went to the Defendant's

residence to pick up Trevor and when he left, the Defendant emerged
from the garage, stood at the opening thereof and simulated holding
a gun pointed at the Plaintiff's automobile.
13.

On

the

21st

day

of

June,

1992

when

Plaintiff

was

returning Trevor after visitation, the Defendant was on the porch
of the residence within 18 inches to two feet of the Plaintiff,
where he glared at Plaintiff with an intimidating demeanor and
presence.
14.

On the 25th of May and the 20th of June, 1992 both the

parties to this action were aware that there was bad blood and a
feeling of hostility between them.
15.

Defendant had knowledge of the times of day on the 25th

day of May and the 20th day of June that Plaintiff was going to be
at the Defendant's residence in connection with exercising his
4
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visitation with Trevor.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Prior to May 25, 1992, the Defendant was aware that

because of his request, the requirement that he not be within 50
feet of the Plaintiff had been modified and the Court had ordered
that there should be a substantial distance between the parties to
avoid future problems and that the parties were ordered to conduct
themselves reasonably in the presence of each other.
2.

Having knowledge that the Plaintiff was scheduled to come

to the Defendant's residence in connection with visiting Trevor,
the Defendant knowingly and intentionally placed himself within 18
inches to

2

feet of

the

Plaintiff

and, with

body

language,

threatened the Plaintiff.
3.

The conduct of the Defendant on May 25 and June 20, 1992

was in violation of the Order of the Court entered in this matter
on the 5th day of June, 1992.
4.

Based upon the conduct of the Defendant, it is reasonable

that he be held in contempt, fined $100 and ordered to pay
Plaintiff's

attorney's

fees

incurred

in

connection

with

the

contempt proceedings.
5.

The Order dated June 5, 1992 should be modified to
5
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require that the Defendant not be within 50 feet of the Plaintiff
when he comes to pick up and return Trevor for visitation but the
Order should not require the Defendant to leave his home.
DATED this

//

day of September, 1992.
BY THE COURT

_^
\^Z»~*<S4th

F r a n k G. Noel /V'gjitfgeV^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 310 South
Main, #1400, Salt Lake City, UT

8410jL^this

day of September,

1992.
/

afaomafe RXBlonquist
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ORDER IN RE CONTEMPT
(dated September 11, 1992)

SEP 1 1 1S92
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525

isw^/~tty CnwfX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN MARK HANSEN,

]
)

ORDER IN RE CONTEMPT
and RESTRAINING ORDER

v.

]|

Civil No. 920902292CV

TONY DONNELLY,

]I

Judge Frank G. Noel

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

]

Having heretofore made and entered it's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now, in accordance therewith, and upon the
Motion of the Plaintiff and good cause appearing therefor
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to
§78-32-1(5), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) Defendant be
and he is hereby held in contempt of Court for his willful and
knowing disobedience of the Order entered in the above entitled
matter on the 5th day of June, 1992; pursuant to §78-32-10 Utah
Code Annotated (1953, as amended), Defendant is ordered to pay a
fine in the sum of $100 and pursuant to

§78-34-11 Utah Code

Annotated (1953, as amended), Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff
such

sum

as

is

sufficient

to

indemnify

him

for

reasonable

attorney's fees incurred in connection with this contempt proceeding•
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant
be and he is hereby restrained from being within 50 feet of the
Defendant

when

he

picks

up

and

delivers

Trevor

to

exercise

visitation, however, if the Defendant is in his residence when this
occurs, he is not required to leave the same but must be in another
room or in a separate area of the home to provide sufficient
distance between the Parties so that there will be no further
confrontations between them whatsoever.
DATED this

IL

day of September, 1992
BY THE COURT

Frank G. Noel, Judge ^-^V/ J

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 310 South
Main, #1400, Salt Lake City, UT

84101 this

"day of September,

1992.

bmas R/^lonquist
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT

SEP 2 5 1S92
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN MARK HANSEN,
Plaintiff,

)
)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
and REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

v.

])

Civil No. 920902292CV

TONY DONNELLY,

]i

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment was filed pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of
Judicial

Administration.

Plaintiff

filed

a

Memorandum

in

Opposition to the Defendant's Motion after which a Notice to Submit
for Decision and Request for Ruling was filed by the Defendant.
The Court, having reviewed the Motion together with a response
thereto and having ruled on the said Motion and made a Minute Entry
setting forth said ruling, now, being fully advised in the premises
and good cause appearing therefor
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant's
Motion for Relief from Judgment and Request for Oral Argument be
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and the same are hereby denied.
DATED this

day of September, 1992.
BY THE COURT

Frank G. Noel, Judge"-,;

MAILING CERTIFICATE

^ ^ ^ ^

I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 310 South
Main, #1400, Salt Lake City, UT

84lathis

KL

day of September,

1992.

-2-
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JUDGMENT
(dated October 6, 1992)

OCT 0 6 1S92
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525

•ft
us^ly Cans

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN MARK HANSEN,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 920902292CV

TONY DONNELLY,

Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendant.

Having heretofore made and entered it's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions and Order in re Contempt and Restraining Order and now
having reviewed the Affidavit of Plaintiff's attorney relative to
contempt proceeding fees and otherwise being fully advised in the
premises and good cause appearing therefor
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff be
and he is hereby awarded Judgment against the Defendant in the sum
Of v2,12b-«as and for the Plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in
connection with the contempt proceedings in the above entitled
action.
DATED this

10

oJK

day of SeptGItftfer,

199?,

w^r
0100

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to Mary C. Corporon, Esq.,
310 South Main, #1400, Salt Lake City, UT^ 84101 this

JS*

day of

September, 1992.
Thomas R

onquist

/

-2-

b JL v.. I

NOTICE OF APPEAL

F'LrD
J)l37R!C^C0URT

OCT

9 4 35 PH '92

Thl'

O ov

7
u> O
Go

..STRICT

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
STEVEN MARK HANSEN,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

-vs-

Civil NO.

TONY DONNELLY,

Judge Frank G. Noel

920902292

Defendant.

DEFENDANT TO

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED

ACTION, by and through his

counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, hereby appeals
re: contempt

the order in

and restraining order entered in the above-entitled

action.
DATED THIS

^7 day of

£)C

-h36e^—

1992.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

M A R Y , ^ CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant

0102

